Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology: How Can We Know What is Possible and What Impossible?

Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-16 (2000)
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Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00926.x
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Van Inwagen's Modal Skepticism.Peter Hawke - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):351-364.
Intuitions and Semantic Theory.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.
The Positive Function of Evil?Michael Levine - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):149-165.
Imagination and Possibility.Rebecca Hanrahan - 2007 - Philosophical Forum 38 (2):125–146.

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