Reply to Nagel 5/23; 18bot+end

Keith DeRose
Yale University
The key test cases for deciding between my brand of contextualism and Jennifer Nagel’s brand of invariantism are the third-person examples. As matters currently stand, first-person cases, like my original Bank cases (pp. 1-2), are pretty useless here. Nagel can agree that the speaker’s claim to “know” in Case A and his admission that he doesn’t “know” in Case B are both true; she just accepts a different account of why it is that both assertions can be, and are, true, according to which it is because in B the speaker doesn’t meet the attitude requirement for knowledge, while he does meet that requirement in A. Perhaps not at all unexpectedly, I find my proposed explanation more plausible; presumably, Nagel sees things differently. We can try to hash this out, but extremely tricky questions, and no stable enough answers, about how to understand the attitude needed for knowledge derail this attempt to decide between accounts. But no worries: Without having to first decide these issues, third-person cases provide the natural test cases to decide between the views. We can use them to decide between theories, and then go back to the first-person cases and apply what we’ve learned from the third-person cases to guide our handling of the trickier firstperson cases
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,299
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Personal Identity and Postmortem Survival.Stephen E. Braude - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):226-249.
The Attitude of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):678-685.
Imagination and theI.Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535.
How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?Jakob Elster - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3):241-258.
Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Person?Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
Motivating Williamson's Model Gettier Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):54-62.
A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem.Igor Douven - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.


Added to PP index

Total views
46 ( #195,945 of 2,290,759 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #834,658 of 2,290,759 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature