Slouching Towards Dualism [Book Review]

Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (216):257-263 (2001)

David Sosa
University of Texas at Austin
Searle may protest too much his anti-dualism. It may be that what needs reconsideration is not so much the traditional opposition between material and mental as the supposed opposition between property dualism and our contemporary scientific world view. Searle at one points notes that "[w]hen we come to the proposition that reality is physical, we come to what is perhaps the crux of the whole discussion." I agree.
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
What is It Like to Be a Bat.Thomas Nagel - 1974 - E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 5.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Minds, Brains and Science.Stephen P. Stich - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):129.

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