The Disjunctive Theory of Perception

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition) (2009)
Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the conscious experience that occurs in each of these three cases. Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception deny this. Disjunctivists typically reject the claim that the same kind of experience is common to all three cases because they hold views about the nature of veridical perception that are inconsistent with it
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,780
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism.Mattia Riccardi - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):443-454.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Disjunctivism.William Fish - 2009 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Object Perception: Vision and Audition.Casey O'Callaghan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):803-829.
The Subjective View of Experience and its Objective Commitments.Matthew Soteriou - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):177-190.
Silencing the Argument From Hallucination.István Aranyosi - 2014 - In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).
An Enactive-Phenomenological Approach to Veridical Perception.Shannon Vallor - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):39-60.
Perception and Metaphysical Skepticism.Paul Coates - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):1-28.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
141 ( #37,460 of 2,214,632 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #173,497 of 2,214,632 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature