Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543 (2019)

Authors
Jacob Sparks
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo
Abstract
Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non- moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology.
Keywords moral epistemology  metaethics  regress argument  reliability challenge  moral realism  accidentality  inferentialism  coincidence  intuitionism  moral perception
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2018.1501400
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.

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