Imagination Through Knowledge

In Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 207-226 (2016)

Authors
Shannon Spaulding
Oklahoma State University
Abstract
Imagination seems to play an epistemic role in philosophical and scientific thought experiments, mindreading, and ordinary practical deliberations insofar as it generates new knowledge of contingent facts about the world. However, it also seems that imagination is limited to creative generation of ideas. Sometimes we imagine fanciful ideas that depart freely from reality. The conjunction of these claims is what I call the puzzle of knowledge through imagination. This chapter aims to resolve this puzzle. I argue that imagination has an epistemic role to play, but it is limited to the context of discovery. Imagination generates ideas, but other cognitive capacities must be employed to evaluate these ideas in order for them to count as knowledge. Consideration of the Simulation Theory's so-called "threat of collapse” provides further evidence that imagination does not, on its own, yield new knowledge of contingent facts, and it suggests a way to supplement imagination in order to get such knowledge.
Keywords Imagination  Simulation  Mindreading  Perceptual Knowledge  Thought Experiments
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Between Perception and Action.Bence Nanay - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Synthese 109 (3):413-434.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Imagination in Scientific Practice.Steven French - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-19.
Biased by Our Imaginings.Ema Sullivan‐Bissett - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-06-21

Total views
1,032 ( #3,118 of 2,310,276 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
113 ( #4,752 of 2,310,276 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature