On Direct Social Perception

Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482 (2015)
Abstract
Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.
Keywords Social cognition  Perception  Theory of Mind
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.003
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References found in this work BETA
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
Direct Perception in the Intersubjective Context.S. Gallagher - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):535-543.
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.

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Citations of this work BETA
On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
Can We Perceive Mental States?Eleonore Neufeld - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds.Elijah Chudnoff - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:276-298.
Phenomenology of Social Cognition.Spaulding Shannon - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):1069-1089.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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