Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (5):276-279 (2011)

Robert Sparrow
Monash University
This paper criticises John Harris's attempts to defend an account of a ‘harmed condition’ that can stand independently of intuitions about what is ‘normal’. I argue that because Homo sapiens is a sexually dimorphic species, determining whether a particular individual is in a harmed condition or not will sometimes require making reference to the normal capacities of their sex. Consequently, Harris's account is unable to play the role he intends for it in debates about the ethics of human enhancement.
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DOI 10.1136/jme.2010.039982
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Imposing Genetic Diversity.Robert Sparrow - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics 15 (6):2-10.
Sexism and Human Enhancement.Robert Sparrow - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (12):732-735.

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