Philosophy of Science 80 (1):73-93 (2013)

Authors
Aris Spanos
Virginia Tech
Abstract
The article revisits the large n problem as it relates to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox to compare the frequentist, Bayesian, and likelihoodist approaches to inference and evidence. It is argued that what is fallacious is to interpret a rejection of as providing the same evidence for a particular alternative, irrespective of n; this is an example of the fallacy of rejection. Moreover, the Bayesian and likelihoodist approaches are shown to be susceptible to the fallacy of acceptance. The key difference is that in frequentist testing the severity evaluation circumvents both fallacies but no such principled remedy exists for the other approaches.
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DOI 10.1086/668875
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References found in this work BETA

Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.
Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
Is Frequentist Testing Vulnerable to the Base-Rate Fallacy?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):565-583.

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Citations of this work BETA

Classical Versus Bayesian Statistics.Eric Johannesson - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):302-318.
On the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox.Christian P. Robert - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (2):216-232,.
Cosmic Bayes. Datasets and Priors in the Hunt for Dark Energy.Michela Massimi - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-21.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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