An argument against causal decision theory

Analysis 81 (1):52-61 (2021)

Abstract

This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.

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Author's Profile

Jack Spencer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

References found in this work

Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
Evidence, Decision and Causality.Arif Ahmed - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.

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Citations of this work

Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.
Escaping the Cycle.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):99-127.

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