Analysis (forthcoming)

Authors
Jack Spencer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
Keywords causal decision theory  rationality  newcomb's problem  decision theory
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anaa037
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References found in this work BETA

Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Evidence, Decision and Causality.Arif Ahmed - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism.Jack Spencer - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
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