Attention and intentionalism

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342 (2010)
Abstract
Many alleged counter-examples to intentionalism, the thesis that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of a given sense modality supervenes on the contents of experiences of that modality, can be avoided by adopting a liberal view of the sorts of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. I argue that there is a class of counter-examples to intentionalism, based on shifts in attention, which avoids this response. A necessary connection between the contents and phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences can be preserved by distinguishing perceptual phenomenology from the phenomenology of attention; but even if this distinction is viable, these cases put pressure on the thesis that phenomenal character can, in general, be explained in terms of mental representation.
Keywords attention   intentionalism   representationalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.617.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,495
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness.Michael Tye - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
What is Conscious Attention?Wayne Wu - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):93-120.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Against Intentionalism.Bernhard Nickel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304.
Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind.Vivienne Brown - 2007 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (1):25-62.
Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Watkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Experience and Intentional Content.Ian Phillips - 2005 - Dissertation, Oxford University
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
Added to PP index
2009-02-10

Total downloads
173 ( #28,213 of 2,210,575 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #54,980 of 2,210,575 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature