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Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism
Mind 125 (498):511-539 (2016)
Abstract
Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I articulate an invariantist account of disagreement that is compatible with reversibility.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based.Barbara Vetter - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):766-795.
Might do Better: Flexible Relativism and the QUD.Bob Beddor & Andy Egan - 2018 - Semantics and Pragmatics 11.
On Losing Disagreements: Spencer’s Attitudinal Relativism.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):541-551.
References found in this work
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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