Epistemic two-dimensionalism and the epistemic argument

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78 (2010)
Authors
Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
One of Kripke's fundamental objections to descriptivism was that the theory misclassifies certain _a posteriori_ propositions expressed by sentences involving names as _a priori_. Though nowadays very few philosophers would endorse a descriptivism of the sort that Kripke criticized, many find two-dimensional semantics attractive as a kind of successor theory. Because two-dimensionalism needn't be a form of descriptivism, it is not open to the epistemic argument as formulated by Kripke; but the most promising versions of two-dimensionalism are open to a close relative of that argument
Keywords two-dimensionalism  Chalmers  epistemic argument
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802674727
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intensions and Indeterminacy: Reply to Soames, Turner, and Wilson.David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):249-269.
Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Empirical Presuppositions.Laura Schroeter - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):391-394.
No Easy Argument for Two-Dimensionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):775-781.
Epistemic Intensions.Scott Soames - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):220-228.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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