Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame
Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is a priori, seems a posteriori to most speakers, and would typically be used to convey a posteriori propositions, there is another which (again, by Millian lights) is a priori, seems a posteriori to most speakers, but can only typically be used to convey a priori propositions
Keywords Frege's puzzle  Millianism
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00419.x
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References found in this work BETA

Semantic Relationism.Kit Fine - 2007 - Blackwell.
Understanding Belief Reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.

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