Authors
Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
I argue that the best way to solve Russell's problem of the relationship between propositions and their constituents is to think of propositions as properties of worlds. I argue that this view preserves the strengths and avoids some of the weaknesses of the view of the metaphysics of propositions defended by Jeff King in his _The Nature and Structure of Content_, and that it provides an explanation of the representational properties of propositions and the nature of indexical belief. I conclude by discussing some problems about how to think about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, if a view of this sort is correct.
Keywords Russell  unity of the proposition
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,480
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
The Obscure Object of Hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why It Isn't Syntax That Unifies the Proposition.Logan Fletcher - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):590-611.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-12-09

Total views
180 ( #47,685 of 2,330,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #81,798 of 2,330,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes