Facts, properties, and the nature of the proposition

Authors
Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
I argue that the best way to solve Russell's problem of the relationship between propositions and their constituents is to think of propositions as properties of worlds. I argue that this view preserves the strengths and avoids some of the weaknesses of the view of the metaphysics of propositions defended by Jeff King in his _The Nature and Structure of Content_, and that it provides an explanation of the representational properties of propositions and the nature of indexical belief. I conclude by discussing some problems about how to think about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, if a view of this sort is correct.
Keywords Russell  unity of the proposition
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,762
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Russell and the Unity of the Proposition.Graham Stevens - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):491–506.
Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation.Philip L. Peterson - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
Russell and Richard Brinkley on the Unity of the Proposition.Richard Gaskin - 1997 - History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):139-150.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-12-09

Total downloads
151 ( #37,535 of 2,263,214 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #141,478 of 2,263,214 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature