AbstractI argue that the best way to solve Russell's problem of the relationship between propositions and their constituents is to think of propositions as properties of worlds. I argue that this view preserves the strengths and avoids some of the weaknesses of the view of the metaphysics of propositions defended by Jeff King in his _The Nature and Structure of Content_, and that it provides an explanation of the representational properties of propositions and the nature of indexical belief. I conclude by discussing some problems about how to think about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, if a view of this sort is correct.
Similar books and articles
What in the world are the ways things might have been? [REVIEW]Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):443 - 453.
Russell and Richard Brinkley on the unity of the proposition.Richard Gaskin - 1997 - History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):139-150.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Why it isn't syntax that unifies the proposition.Logan Fletcher - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):590-611.
Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities.Shamik Chakravarty - 2021 - Dissertation, Lingnan University
References found in this work
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 12 (1):109-110.