Gaslighting, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence

Topoi:1-13 (forthcoming)
Authors
Andrew Spear
Grand Valley State University
Abstract
Recent literature on epistemic innocence develops the idea that a defective cognitive process may nevertheless merit special consideration insofar as it confers an epistemic benefit that would not otherwise be available. For example, confabulation may be epistemically innocent when it makes a subject more likely to form future true beliefs or helps her maintain a coherent self-concept. I consider the role of confabulation in typical cases of interpersonal gaslighting, and argue that confabulation will not be epistemically innocent in such cases even if it does preserve a coherent self-concept or belief-set for the subject. Analyzing the role of confabulation in gaslighting illustrates its role in on-going interpersonal relationships, and augments already growing evidence that confabulation may be quite widespread. The role of confabulation in gaslighting shows that whether confabulation confers epistemic benefits will depend greatly on the interpersonal context in which it is deployed, while whether a coherent self-concept is epistemically beneficial will depend to a great extent on the content of that self-concept. This shows that the notion of an epistemically harmful or beneficial feature of a cognitive process can and should be further clarified, and that doing so has both theoretical and practical advantages in understanding epistemic innocence itself.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9611-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,113
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Essential Tension.T. S. Kuhn - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):359-375.
The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Epistemic Innocence of Psychedelic States.Chris Letheby - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:28-37.
Stranger Than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):227-249.
Confabulation, Confidence, and Introspection.Brian Fiala & Shaun Nichols - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):144-145.
Confabulation and Rational Obligations for Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1215-1238.
Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation.Eivind Balsvik - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):311-329.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-11-09

Total views
10 ( #573,030 of 2,313,542 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #70,390 of 2,313,542 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature