Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83 (1997)
Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold "reflective beliefs" are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide explicit arguments in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts
|Keywords||Belief Cognition Intuition Metaphysics Mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Understanding Verbal Understanding.Dan Sperber - 1994 - In Jean Khalfa (ed.), What is Intelligence? Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Vigilance.Dan Sperber, Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, Gloria Origgi & Deirdre Wilson - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):359-393.
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Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW]Joëlle Proust - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.
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