In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction

Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (2):221-245 (1991)

The mentalist mind-brain model is defended against alleged weaknesses. I argue that the perceived failings are based mostly on misinterpretation of mentalism and emergent interaction. Considering the paradigmatic concepts at issue and broad implications, I try to better clarify the misread mentalist view, adding more inclusive detail, relevant background, further analysis, and comparing its foundational concepts with those of the new cognitive paradigm in psychology. A changed "emergent interactionist" form of causation is posited that combines traditional microdeterminism with emergent "top-down" control. This emergent form of causation has wide application to causal explanation in general and is hypothesized to be the key common precursor for the consciousness revolution and subsequent boom in new worldviews, "systems thinking," emerging new paradigms, and other transformative developments of the 1970s and 1980s
Keywords Consciousness  Emergentism  Interactionism  Mentalism  Metaphysics  Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,289
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Emergence.Robert Michael Francescotti - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):47 - 63.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views

Recent downloads (6 months)

How can I increase my downloads?


Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes