Is mental content prior to linguistic meaning?: Stalnaker on intentionality

Noûs 40 (3):428-467 (2006)

Authors
Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Since the 1960's, work in the analytic tradition on the nature of mental and linguistic content has converged on the views that social facts about public language meaning are derived from facts about the thoughts of individuals, and that these thoughts are constituted by properties of the internal states of agents. I give a two-part argument against this picture of intentionality: first, that if mental content is prior to public language meaning, then a view of mental content much like the causal-pragmatic theory presented by Robert Stalnaker in Inquiry must be correct; second, that the causal-pragmatic theory is false. I conclude with some positive suggestions regarding alternative solutions to the `problem of intentionality.'.
Keywords Stalnaker  intentionality  indication  mental content
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00619.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
Varieties of Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
“Assertion” and Intentionality.Jason Stanley - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113.
Causal Theories of Mental Content.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.

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