Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800 (2020)
Authors |
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Abstract |
Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options
are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame
quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and
instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are
made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay
then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is
capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision
theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory
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Keywords | rationality consequentialism decision theory rational choice causal decision theory newcomb's problem |
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Reprint years | 2021 |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-020-01509-9 |
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References found in this work BETA
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission.Jack Spencer - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3819-3842.
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