Erkenntnis 78 (5):1177-1184 (2013)

Authors
Joshua Spencer
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Abstract
The general composition question asks “what are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any xs and any y must satisfy in order for it to be true that those xs compose that y?” Although this question has received little attention, there is an interesting and theoretically fruitful answer. Namely, strong composition as identity (SCAI): necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are identical to y. SCAI is theoretically fruitful because if it is true, then there is an answer to one of the most difficult and intractable questions of mereology (The Simple Question). In this paper, I introduce the identity account of simplicity and argue that if SCAI is true then this identity account of simplicity is as well. I consider an objection to the identity account of simplicity. Ultimately, I find this objection unsuccessful
Keywords Mereology  Composition  Composition as Identity  Identity  Simples
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9387-2
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References found in this work BETA

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ontological Innocence.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - In A. J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.
No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing.Sam Cowling - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):246-260.
What is an Ersatz Part?Kristie Miller & Johann Hariman - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):524-551.
What is an Ersatz Part?Kristie Miller & Johann Hariman - 2017 - New Content is Available for Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):524-551.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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