Authors
Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
One of Kripke's fundamental objections to descriptivism was that the theory misclassifies certain a posteriori propositions expressed by sentences involving names as a priori. Though nowadays very few philosophers would endorse a descriptivism of the sort that Kripke criticized, many find two-dimensional semantics attractive as a kind of successor theory. Because two-dimensionalism needn't be a form of descriptivism, it is not open to the epistemic argument as formulated by Kripke; but the most promising versions of two-dimensionalism are open to a close relative of that argument.
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Reprint years 2010
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802674727
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Two-Dimensional Semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Individuating Fregean Sense.Jeff Speaks - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):634-654.

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