Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content

Abstract
I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by arguing that Russellianism is consistent with intentionalism, that their conjunction is consistent with both internalism about phenomenology and externalism about perceptual content, and that the resulting view receives independent support from the relationship between hallucination and thought.
Keywords intentionalism  transparency
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00293.x
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References found in this work BETA
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.

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Citations of this work BETA
Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.

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