David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573 (2009)
I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by arguing that Russellianism is consistent with intentionalism, that their conjunction is consistent with both internalism about phenomenology and externalism about perceptual content, and that the resulting view receives independent support from the relationship between hallucination and thought.
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Citations of this work BETA
Fabian Dorsch (2016). The Phenomenology of Attitudes and the Salience of Rational Role and Determination. Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):114-137.
Michael Tye (2014). Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
Boyd Millar (2016). Frege's Puzzle for Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.
Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Andrew Stephenson (2015). Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and Hallucination. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):486-508.
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