The impertinence of Frankfurt-style argument

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95 (2007)
Abstract
Discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities have largely ignored the limits of what Frankfurt-style counter-examples can show. Rather than challenging the coherence of the cases, I argue that even if they are taken to demonstrate the falsity of the principle, they cannot advance the compatibilist cause. For a forceful incompatibilist argument can be constructed from the Frankfurtian premise that agents in Frankfurtian circumstances would have done what they did even if they could have done something else. This 'counterfactual stability' meets the same fate under determinism as does the ability to do otherwise. Thus the cases are irrelevant to the compatibility debate
Keywords MORAL RESPONSIBILITY   ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES   PRINCIPLE
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.470.x
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References found in this work BETA
Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action.David P. Hunt - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.

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Citations of this work BETA
Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases.Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument.John Martin Fischer - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.

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