Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view

Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):259-80 (1992)
Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional philosophic dichotomies. Formerly opposed features from previous polar alternatives become merged into a novel unifying synthesis, an unambiguous description of which demands redefinition of old terms or/and the invention of new terminology. The present analysis and interpretation are backed by statements from the early papers
Keywords Behaviorism  Consciousness  Mentalism  Science
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Complexity-Based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints.Kari Theurer - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (3):277-301.

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