What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway)

Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162 (2013)
Abstract
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities is the intuitive idea that someone is morally responsible for an action only if she could have done otherwise. Harry Frankfurt has famously presented putative counterexamples to this intuitive principle. In this paper, I formulate a simple version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a course-grained notion of actions. After warming up with a Frankfurt-Style Counterexample to this principle, I introduce a new kind of counterexample based on the possibility of time travel. At the end of the paper, I formulate a more sophisticated version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities that invokes a certain fine grained notion of actions. I then explain how this new kind of counterexample can be augmented to show that even the more sophisticated principle is false
Keywords Time travel  Principle of Alternative Possibilities  Frankfurt
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0029-y
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References found in this work BETA
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Time Travel, Coincidences and Counterfactuals.Theodore Sider - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):115 - 138.
What Time Travelers Cannot Do.Kadri Vihvelin - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):315 - 330.
What Time Travelers May Be Able to Do.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):115 - 121.

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Citations of this work BETA
Molinists Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.

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Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
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Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.Vivienne Brown - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.

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