Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (4):ix-x (1996)
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Epistemologists, like other philosophers, sometimes try to convince us of the truth of their claims about the nature of knowledge by appeals to our epistemic intuitions. Sometimes intuitions are gathered and deployed against an epistemological theory: as, for example, when our intuitive judgement that the subject in a Gettier case fails to know what he justifiably and truly believes is used to undermine the view that knowledge is justified true belief. Othertimes intuitions are gathered and deployed in support of an epistemological theory: as, for example, when the same intuition about the Gettier case is used to support the view that knowledge is true belief that could not easily have been wrong. In a more sophisticated way (which I shall describe in more detail), contextualists about knowledge have made appeal to epistemic intuitions a central part of the arguments they offer in support of their view. Appeals to intuition, then, are central to the current methodology of epistemology.



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Emotional behaviour and the scope of belief-desire explanation.Finn Spicer - 2004 - In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 51--68.

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