Disputatio 8 (42):93-112 (2016)

This paper is about a certain view of intentionality, a problem faced by the view, and two ways in which, it has been proposed, the problem might be solved. The view is that every intentional state has an intentional object. The problem is that the putative intentional objects of some intentional states do not, or even cannot, exist. The two strategies to solve the problem and secure the view are those implemented by Tim Crane in his article “Intentional Objects”. In this paper I argue that both Crane’s implementations and the strategies in general are unsuccessful. By way of overview, I also discuss other ways in which the problem has been addressed.
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2016-0004
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
The Objects of Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Harvard University Press.
Intentionality.John R. Searle - 1984 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.

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Citations of this work BETA

(Mock-)Thinking About the Same.Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307.

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