The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations

Mind 120 (479):819-832 (2011)
Abstract
The rational price of the Pasadena and Altadena games, introduced by Nover and Hájek (2004 ), has been the subject of considerable discussion. Easwaran (2008 ) has suggested that weak expectations — the value to which the average payoffs converge in probability — can give the rational price of such games. We argue against the normative force of weak expectations in the standard framework. Furthermore, we propose to replace this framework by a bounded utility perspective: this shift renders the problem more realistic and accounts for the role of weak expectations. In particular, we demonstrate that in a bounded utility framework, all agents, even if they have different value functions and disagree on the price of an individual game, will finally agree on the rational price of a repeated, averaged game. Thus, we explain the intuitive appeal of weak expectations, while avoiding both trivialization of the original paradox and the drawbacks of previous approaches.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzr060
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References found in this work BETA
Strong and Weak Expectations.Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):633-641.
Vexing Expectations.Harris Nover & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):237-249.
No Expectations.Mark Colyvan - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):695-702.
Complex Expectations.Alan Hájek & Harris Nover - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):643 - 664.

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Citations of this work BETA
Making Do Without Expectations.Paul F. A. Bartha - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):799-827.

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