Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):767–789 (2005)

Authors
Chandra Sripada
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
The problem of moral compliance is the problem of explaining how moral norms are sustained over extented stretches of time despite the existence of selfish evolutionary incentives that favor their violation. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of solutions that have been offered to the problem of moral compliance, the reciprocity-based account and the punishment-based account. In this paper, I argue that though the reciprocity-based account has been widely endorsed by evolutionary theorists, the account is in fact deeply implausible. I provide three arguments that suggest that moral norms are sustained by punishment, not reciprocity. But in addition to solving the problem of moral compliance, the punishment-based account provides an additional important theoretical dividend. It points the way for how theorists might build an evolutionary account of a feature of human groups that has long fascinated and troubled social scientists and moral philosophers – the existence of moral diversity.
Keywords Moral norms  Evolution of morality  Reciprocity  Punishment  Cooperation  Evolutionary game theory  Moral diversity
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-004-5155-2
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References found in this work BETA

The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.
Excuse Validation: A Study in Rule-Breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.
Policing Epistemic Communities.Justin P. Bruner - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):403-416.
Experimental Moral Philosophy.Mark Alfano & Don Loeb - 2014 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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