Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113 (2010)

Authors
Jason Stanley
Yale University
Abstract
Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in "Assertion" is not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege's Puzzle
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Ethics   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9588-y
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

On a Case for Truth‐Relativism.Jason Stanley - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):179-188.

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