Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):665-678 (2008)
There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexify of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a fairly strong version of the unity of the virtues
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.Michael Stocker - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453-466.
Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties.Jonathan Dancy - 1983 - Mind 92 (368):530-547.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Kant's Conception of Virtue.Lara Denis - 2006 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems.Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Does Virtue Ethics Really Exclude Duty Ethics?Piotr Szalek - 2010 - International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):351-361.
After Kohlberg: Virtue Ethics and the Recovery of the Moral Self.Vincent A. Punzo - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):7 – 23.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads115 ( #42,592 of 2,169,723 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #49,578 of 2,169,723 )
How can I increase my downloads?