Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics

Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322 (2004)
Authors
Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This paper concerns the applications of two-dimensional modal semantics to the explanation of the contents of speech and thought. Different interpretations and applications of the apparatus are contrasted. First, it is argued that David Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics for indexical expressions is different from the use that I made of a formally similar framework to represent the role of contingent information in the determination of what is said. But the two applications are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, my interpretation of the apparatus is contrasted with that of David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, and David Lewis. It is argued that this difference reflects a contrast between internalist and externalist approaches to the problem of intentionality
Keywords Assertion  Dimension  Logic  Modal Logic  Semantics  Chalmers, D  Kaplan, D  Lewis, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019550.81145.34
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,225
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.
Bootstrapping Our Way to Samesaying.Laura Schroeter - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):177-197.
Why Be an Anti-Individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
298 ( #13,256 of 2,242,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #30,813 of 2,242,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature