Philosophia 16 (3-4):333-344 (1986)

Philosophia (Israel), 16(3-4), 333 - 344. YEAR: 1986 Extensive corrigenda Vol. 17, no. 3. SUBJECT(S): Quine's second thoughts on quantifying in, appearing in the second, revised edition of _From a Logical Point of View_ of 1961, are shown to be incorrect. His original thoughts were correct. ABSTRACT: Additional tumult is supplied to pp. 152-154 of _From A Logical Point of View_, showing that being dated is no guarantee of being right. Among other things, it is shown that Quine's argument to the conclusion that limiting the universe of discourse to intensional entities does not "relieve the original difficulty over quantifying into modal contexts" is incorrect; that the contradictory of that conclusion is in fact true; and that an even stronger conclusion is true, with 'abstract' replacing 'intensional'.
Keywords modal logic, quantifying in, abstracta
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379751
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References found in this work BETA

Notes on Existence and Necessity.Willard V. Quine - 1943 - Journal of Philosophy 40 (5):113-127.
The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic.W. V. Quine - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):43-48.
Reply to Professor Marcus.W. V. Quine - 1961 - Synthese 13 (4):323 - 330.
Identity and Sameness.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (1-2):121-150.
Reference, Essentialism, and Modality.Leonard Linsky - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (20):687-700.

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