Contraction and revision

Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77 (2016)
Authors
Shawn Standefer
University of Melbourne
Abstract
An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
Keywords non-contractive theory of truth  revision theory  sequents
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26686/ajl.v13i3.3935
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-9.
Infinitary Contraction‐Free Revenge.Andreas Fjellstad - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):179-189.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Foundational Belief Change.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.
Contractions of Noncontractive Consequence Relations.Rohan French & David Ripley - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):506-528.
A Survey of Multiple Contractions.André Fuhrmann & Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (1):39-75.
Descriptor Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (5):955-980.
Naive Modus Ponens.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (4):575-593.
Norm-System Revision: Theory and Application. [REVIEW]Audun Stolpe - 2010 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 18 (3):247-283.
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-19

Total downloads
149 ( #41,320 of 2,303,776 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #18,886 of 2,303,776 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature