Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes

Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294 (2019)

Authors
Julia Staffel
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
In this paper, I highlight an interesting difference between belief on the one hand, and suspended judgment and credence on the other hand. This difference is the following: credences and suspended judgments are suitable to serve as transitional as well as terminal attitudes in our reasoning, whereas beliefs are only appropriate as terminal attitudes. The notion of a transitional attitude is not an established one in the literature, but I argue that introducing it helps us better understand the different roles suspended judgments and credences can play in our reasoning. Transitional and terminal attitudes have interestingly different descriptive and normative properties. I also compare my account of transitional attitudes to other inquiry-guiding attitudes that have recently been characterized in the literature and explain why they are different.
Keywords credence  suspension  suspended judgment  doxastic attitude  rationality  reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12154
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References found in this work BETA

Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.

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