Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence


Authors
Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University
Abstract
The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidence possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses is resolved by applying the concept of duty to belief indirectly.
Keywords ethics of belief  epistemic duty
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DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p147
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References found in this work BETA

Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Adler - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases.Logan Paul Gage - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1):57-70.

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