Exceeding Our Grasp

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139 (2008)
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Abstract

In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp.

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Epistemic instrumentalism, exceeding our grasp.Arthur Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139.
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Author's Profile

Kyle Stanford
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):342-359.
Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.
The No Alternatives Argument.Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):213-234.
A Confrontation of Convergent Realism.Peter Vickers - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):189-211.

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