Freedom, Knowledge and Affection: Reply to Hogan

Kantian Review 18 (1):99-106 (2013)
Abstract
In a recent paper, Desmond Hogan aims to explain how Kant could have consistently held that noumenal affection is not only compatible with noumenal ignorance but also with the claim that experience requires causal affection of human cognitive agents by things in themselves. Hogan's argument includes the premise that human cognitive agents have empirical knowledge of one another's actions. Hogan's argument fails because the premise that we have empirical knowledge of one another's actions is ambiguous. On one reading, the argument is valid but its conclusion trivial. On the other, it is unsound on Kant's own view.
Keywords Kant  Noumenal Affection  Freedom
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415412000301
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Law and Moral Agency in De Libero Arbitrio I.Ivan Welty - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-14.

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