Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):211-226 (1994)
Gestalt theory is discussed as one main precursor of synergetics, one of the most elaborated theories of self-organization. It is a precursor for two reasons: the Gestalt theoretical view of cognitive order-formation comes dose to the central ideas of self-organization. Furthermore both approaches have stressed the significance of non-linear perceptual processes (such as multistability) for the solution of the mind-brain problem. The question of whether Gestalt theory preferred a dualistic or a monistic view of the mind-body relation is answered in that there was a preference for dualism in epistemological questions and for monism in the mind-brain relation. The latter was attained by the concept of psychophysical isomorphism. This concept, although widely misunderstood in many respects, was criticized on the basis of neurobiological findings. One main objection was the neglect of the importance of the elementary neurophysiological processes. A distinction between macroscopic and microscopic brain processes seemed to be required. This idea was taken up in synergetics which postulates a bottom-up and top-down interaction between these two levels. Macroscopic order emerges from elementary brain processes and, at the same time, has a backward slaving effect to the microscopic level In the light of such holistic emergentism, the question whether macroscopic order states might be attractors for psychological meanings is discussed
|Keywords||Cognition Epistemology Gestalt Holism Isomorphism Metaphysics Synergetics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
How Brains Make Chaos in Order to Make Sense of the World.Christine A. Skarda & Walter J. Freeman - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):161.
The Mind-Body Problem: A Psychobiological Approach.Mario Augusto Bunge - 1980 - Pergamon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Perceivable Information Or: The Happy Marriage Between Ecological Psychology and Gestalt.Cees van Leeuwen & John Stins - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):267-285.
Similar books and articles
We Can't Fill in Answers to Philosophical Questions.Lloyd Kaufman - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):760-761.
Double, Double, Toil and Trouble – Fire Burn, and Theory Bubble!Birgitta Dresp - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):409-410.
Is the World in the Brain, or the Brain in the World? (A Commentary on Lehar, S. Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of Subjective Conscious Experience: A Gestalt Bubble Model, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in Press).Professor Max Velmans - 2003 - Velmans, Professor Max (2003) is the World in the Brain, or the Brain in the World? (A Commentary on Lehar, S. Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of Subjective Conscious Experience.
Gestalt Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind.William M. Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.
A Logical Analysis of 'Psychological Isomorphism'.Edward H. Madden - 1957 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (November):177-191.
Next Step, Synergetics?Wolfgang Tschacher & Ulrich M. Junghan - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):66-67.
Gestalt Theory has Been Misinterpreted, but has Had Some Real Conceptual Difficulties.Gaetano Kanizsa - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):149-162.
Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of Subjective Conscious Experience: A Gestalt Bubble Model.Steven Lehar - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):357-408.
Gestalt Isomorphism and the Primacy of the Subjective Perceptual Experience.Steven Lehar - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):763-764.
A Gestalt Theoretic Account for the Coordination of Perception and Action in Motor Learning.Alf C. Zimmer & Hermann Korndle - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):249-265.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #218,648 of 2,143,803 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #387,162 of 2,143,803 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.