Knowledge and Practical Interests

Oxford University Press (2005)
Authors
Jason Stanley
Yale University
Abstract
Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a number of his strategies appeal to linguistic evidence, it will be of great interest to linguists as well.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Subjectivity  Semantics (Philosophy  Psycholinguistics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2006, 2007
Buy the book $12.37 new (84% off)   $12.49 used (84% off)   $29.71 direct from Amazon (15% off)    Amazon page
Call number BD222.S73 2005
ISBN(s) 0199230439   0199288038   9780199288038     9780199230433
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00067.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,625
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.

View all 232 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
184 ( #29,586 of 2,260,094 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #37,324 of 2,260,094 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature