In John Hawthorne (ed.), Language and Mind. Blackwell. pp. 321--44 (2003)
If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is necessarily true, then what it says must be so. If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is possible, then what it says could be true. Following natural philosophical usage, it would thus seem clear that in assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is assessing what is said by that occurrence. In this paper, I argue that natural philosophical usage misleads here. In assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is not assessing the modal status of the proposition expressed by that occurrence of the sentence.
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Semantics and the Objects of Assertion.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (5):355-380.
Monsters in Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives.Brian Rabern - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
Against the Identification of Assertoric Content with Compositional Value.Brian Rabern - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):75-96.
Proper Names and Relational Modality.Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (5):507 - 535.
Propositions, Semantic Values, and Rigidity.Dilip Ninan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):401-413.
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