Moral knowledge, epistemic externalism, and intuitionism

Ratio 21 (3):329-343 (2008)
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Abstract

This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists might benefit from paying attention to this fact. At the same time, the terrain of moral epistemology (approached as a sub-field of metaethics) needs to be reshaped by the realisation that externalists can steal the thunder of intuitionists when it comes to knowledge constituted by seemingly self-evident beliefs.1.

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Daniel Star
Boston University

Citations of this work

One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
Moral intuitionism and disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge.Preston J. Werner - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (2):164-181.
Two Levels of Moral Thinking.Daniel Star - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1:75-96.

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References found in this work

Introduction.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2004 - In On What We Owe to Each Other. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 1-17.

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