Novelty, severity, and history in the testing of hypotheses: The case of the top quark

Philosophy of Science 63 (3):255 (1996)
It is sometimes held that facts confirm a hypothesis only if they were not used in the construction of that hypothesis. This requirement of "use novelty" introduces a historical aspect into the assessment of evidence claims. I examine a methodological principle invoked by physicists in the experimental search for the top quark that bears a striking resemblance to this view. However, this principle is better understood, both historically and philosophically, in terms of the need to conduct a severe test than in terms of use novelty. Nevertheless, a historical factor remains in the assessment of some evidence claims
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/289958
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,749
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
The Evidence for the Top Quark: Objectivity..Allan Franklin - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (4):659-661.
What Experiment Did We Just Do?Kent W. Staley - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):279-99.
Novel Evidence and Severe Tests.Deborah G. Mayo - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552.
Novelty and the 1919 Eclipse Experiments.G. R. - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (1):107-129.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
12 ( #389,427 of 2,198,092 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #299,438 of 2,198,092 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature