On Fri, 11 May 2001, Chris Wilson wrote: > Dear Henry:

> On the question of reasons as causes, philosophers generally acknowledge > that reasons can be considered causes (or antecedents of 'regularities') > only to the extent that the reasons are physically realized (instantiated, > represented, embodied, implemented) in the brain. The problem is trying to > find a neural correlate for a mental state containing a 'reason', such that > the reason can become a ('real', 'physical' ) cause
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