Our Knowledge of the Internal World

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2008)
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Abstract

Robert Stalnaker opposes the traditional view that knowledge of one's own current thoughts and feelings is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. He argues that we can understand our knowledge of our thoughts and feelings only by viewing ourselves from the outside, by seeing our inner lives as features of the world as it is in itself.

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Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

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