On the linguistic basis for contextualism

Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146 (2004)
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Abstract

Contextualism in epistemology is the doctrine that the proposition expressed by a knowledge attribution relative to a context is determined in part by the standards of justification salient in that context. The (non-skeptical) contextualist allows that in some context c, a speaker may truly attribute knowledge at a time of a proposition p to Hannah, despite her possession of only weak inductive evidence for the truth of that proposition. Relative to another context, someone may make the very same knowledge attribution to Hannah, yet be speaking falsely, because the epistemic standards in that context are higher. The reason this is possible, according to the contextualist, is that the two knowledge attributions express different propositions.

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.
Contextualism and Relativism.Mark Richard - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):215-242.

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