Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis

In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge. pp. 138–159 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this is an unsatisfactory way of reading Lotze’s Platonism and that the Ricketts-Reck reading of Frege is in fact the correct way of thinking about Lotze’s Platonism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-22

Downloads
461 (#44,387)

6 months
103 (#48,203)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas Stang
University of Toronto, St. George

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
The Frege reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
The Interpretation of Fregeʼs Philosophy.Michael Dummett - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 40 references / Add more references