Quantum logic and the luders rule
Philosophy of Science 49 (3):422-436 (1982)
Abstract
In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Luders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Luders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Luders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at allAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Quantum logic, realism, and value definiteness.Allen Stairs - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):578-602.
The projection postulate as a fortuitous approximation.Paul Teller - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):413-431.
Lüders's rule as a description of individual state transformations.Sergio Martinez - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):359-376.
A search for the physical content of luders' rule.Sergio Martinez - 1990 - Synthese 82 (1):97 - 125.
References found in this work
Quantum Logic, Conditional Probability, and Interference.Michael Friedman & Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Dialectica 32 (3‐4):305-315.
Quantum logic and the projection postulate.Geoffrey Hellman - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):469-486.