Reference and natural kind terms: The real essence of Locke's view

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):78–97 (1998)
J. L. Mackie's famous claim that Locke ‘anticipates’ Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference rests, I suggest, upon a pair of important misunderstandings. Contra Mackie, as well as the more recent accounts of Paul Guyer and Michael Ayers, Lockean Real Essences consist of those features of an entity from which all of its experienceable properties can be logically deduced; thus a substantival Real Essence consists of features of a Real Constitution plus logically necessary objective connections between them and features of some particular Nominal Essence. Furthermore, what Locke actually anticipates is the most significant contemporary challenge to the CTR: the qua‐problem
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00051
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Jan-Erik Jones (2007). Locke Vs. Boyle: The Real Essence of Corpuscular Species. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (4):659 – 684.
Peter R. Anstey & Stephen A. Harris (2006). Locke and Botany. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (2):151-171.
Peter R. Anstey & Stephen A. Harris (2006). Locke and Botany. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (2):151-171.

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